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Wolfgang Spohn’s book The Laws of Beliefs. Ranking Theory and its Philosophical 
Applications is a detailed presentation of ranking theory and its many and varied 
applications in philosophy. It is work in formal or mathematical philosophy, philosophy that 
uses formal or mathematical tools to tackle philosophical problems. The book uses one 
simple and elegant, yet powerful formal tool, namely the theory of ranking functions, and 
applies it fruitfully to a great variety of philosophical problems. These start with problems in 
epistemology such as the representation of belief and its objects as well as justification and 
the a priori. They go to problems in metaphysics such as causation and objectification and 
problems in the philosophy of science such as laws and their confirmation as well as ceteris 
paribus conditions and dispositions. And they include, at least indirectly, problems in the 
philosophy of language such as conditionals and problems in the philosophy of mind such as 
perception and consciousness. The result is a unified picture of the world and our relation to 
it as epistemic agents: a philosophy. It is arrived at in a constructive attempt to reduce all 
“natural” or alethic modalities to non-modal facts on the one hand and doxastic modalities 
as represented by ranking functions (and subjective probability measures) on the other 
hand. And it does so by displaying the virtues of using formal tools to tackle philosophical 
problems. The result is a formal philosophy whose radical nature, however, becomes visible 
only by working through the details, not something one can do over an extended weekend. 
What I consider to be one of its most problematic features is the downside of the 
comprehensiveness of Spohn’s monumental piece: its length is scary, and many parts of the 
book are not an easy read, especially since it contains several new theorems that Spohn 
proves in the main body of text. Minimally, Spohn should have put the proofs in an 
appendix. Ideally he would have outsourced the proofs to technical papers in order to make 
the book more accessible in both length and style. While, as readers, we should not cherish 
the illusion that philosophy is easy, as authors we should try our best to not add to the 
difficulty. 
The plot of the book can be split up into three acts, and I think Spohn should have written 
three books rather than one, or at least he should have cut it up into three digestible 
volumes. That is, at least, how I want to perform the play: the first act corresponds to 
chapters 1-6 and 8-9; the second act roughly corresponds to chapters 10-13 and 16-17; the 
third act roughly corresponds to chapters 7 and 14-15 as well as some elements of chapter 
12. 
Ranking theory 
Spohn arrives at the central notion of a ranking function, originally called “ordinal 
conditional function” in Spohn (1988), as the natural result of combining the frustrations of 
Bayesians to capture the notion of (categorical or outright or yes-or-no) belief (or belief 
simpliciter) in probabilistic terms and the frustrations of belief revision theorists in the AGM 
tradition (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985) to cope with iterated belief changes. 
The first thesis Spohn submits is that subjective probability theory in the Bayesian tradition 
does not have a notion of belief that is capable of being true (p. 44), although it has a 
dynamics that is complete (pp. 37ff). The latter is the case if regularity is imposed as an 
additional constraint on probability measures and Jeffrey conditionalization is adopted as 
update rule, or if classical probabilities are replaced by Popper-Rényi measures (Popper 
1955, Rényi 1955) and these are improved upon as indicated in Spohn (1986) (see also pp. 
202ff). The second thesis Spohn submits is that AGM belief revision theory does not have a 
dynamics that is even moderately complete (pp. 65ff), although it has a notion of belief that 
is capable of being true. In a nutshell the reason is that AGM belief revision theory does not 
have a notion of conditional belief and thus lacks the corresponding notions of (conditional) 
relevance and (conditional) independence. Bayesians and belief revision theorists alike do 
well to study this discussion. 
In order to have a notion of belief that is capable of being true and as well as a complete 
dynamics for this notion that can handle indefinite iterations of belief changes one has to 
represent the agent’s doxastic state by a ranking function. Only in this way the agent’s 
conditional beliefs can be adequately captured. Here is a slightly revised version of Spohn’s 
definition 5.5 with notation adapted (p. 70): let A be a complete algebra of propositions over 
the set of possibilities or possible worlds W. Then  is a ranking function on A if and only if  
is a function from W into the extended natural numbers N+ = N{} such that at least one 
possibility w from W is assigned rank 0.  is extended to propositions A from A by defining 
() =  and (A) = min {(w): w  A} for each non-empty A from A. The rank of a 
proposition A, (A), is interpreted as the agent’s grade of disbelief for A. The agent believes a 
proposition A just in case she assigns a positive degree disbelief to the negation of A, W\A: 
(W\A) > 0. The defining clause that at least one possibility be assigned rank 0 requires the 
agent to not disbelieve every possibility, and thus to not disbelieve every proposition. In 
other words, the static law of belief encapsulated in the definition of a ranking function is 
consistency. 
The dynamic law of belief is stated in terms of conditional ranks, which definition 5.15 
defines as differences of unconditional ranks (p. 78): (w|A) = (w) – (A) if w  A, and  
otherwise, provided (A) < . The agent believes A conditional on C just in case she assigns a 
positive degree of disbelief to the negation of A, W\A, conditional on C: (W\A|C) > 0. 
Definition 5.24 then states what is often called Spohn conditionalization, the rank-theoretic 
analogue to Jeffrey conditionalization in probability theory (p. 83, in slightly revised form and 
with notation adapted): let  be a ranking function on A and let A be a proposition from A 
such that (A), (W\A) < , and let n be a number from N+. Then the An-conditionalization 
An of  is defined by An(w) = (w|A) if w  A, and An(w) = (w|W\A) + n if w  W\A. 
Spohn conditionalization preserves and generalizes AGM belief revision theory (pp. 88ff) and 
provides a complete dynamics. It can be shown to adequately handle indefinite iterations of 
belief changes (pp. 171ff based on Hild & Spohn 2008), which at the same time answers the 
question where the numbers come from by providing a theory of measurement for ranks in 
terms of what belief revision theorists call “contractions” (belief changes where the old 
beliefs are contracted to make them consistent with some new belief). I personally prefer a 
different argument for the thesis that an agent should update her beliefs by Spohn 
conditionalization: the disadvantage is that I have to presuppose a way of measuring ranks; 
the advantage is that we can formulate the dynamic law of belief as diachronic consistency 
so that the “laws of belief” from the title of the book, as formulated in ranking theory, 
require nothing but consistency in a synchronic as well as a diachronic sense (Huber 2007). 
The philosophical applications of ranking theory 
Space does not permit to discuss more than one philosophical application of ranking theory. 
This application, though, is so important that it would have deserved a book on its own. It is 
Causation 
What I consider to be Spohn’s most radical philosophical thesis could have played a more 
prominent role in his book. In its general form the view is only hinted at a few places (pp. 
12ff, 271ff, 442ff, 469ff). In its general content the view is not new, as it has been held by 
David Hume on at least one interpretation. However, in the particular form it is spelt out for 
the particular problem at hand it is genuinely revolutionary, yet, I fear, not well-received. 
Spohn’s view is that all there is are non-modal facts and doxastic modalities, a view he 
shares with Lewis. Lewis’ program of Humean supervenience was to show that all alethic 
modalities such as counterfactuality, causation, lawhood, chance etc. supervene on non-
modal “local matters of particular fact” (Lewis 1986).  Spohn thinks this does not work (pp. 
272; Spohn 2010). Rather what he calls “natural” modalities – causation, lawhood, 
dispositions, chances – are the results of projecting our doxastic modalities – belief and 
degrees of belief – onto the non-modal facts: we are beefing up a world that is much more 
meager than we believe it to be. Spohn represents the doxastic modalities by ranking 
functions and subjective probability measures. The question is what it means that we project 
our thus represented doxastic modalities onto the non-modal facts. Spohn spells out the 
projectivist metaphor for his theory of causation (ch. 14; Spohn 2005) in constructive detail 
and with formal precision. The main thought is the following one (ch. 15; Spohn 1993): 
causation is defined relative to a subjectively interpreted ranking function, but some 
features of this subjective ranking function can be brought into one-to-one correspondence 
with certain non-modal propositions that are objectively true or false. For instance, the 
unconditional beliefs of a subjective ranking function can be brought into one-to-one 
correspondence with certain non-modal propositions that are objectively true or false, viz. 
the contents of those unconditional beliefs. Therefore unconditional belief, as defined in 
rank-theoretic terms, can be objectified (pp. 445ff). Each feature of a ranking function that 
can be uniquely associated with a non-modal proposition can itself be said to be objectively 
true or false, depending on whether the associated non-modal proposition is true or false. 
Thus the question is which features of a ranking function can be objectified in this sense and, 
in particular, if causation can be so objectified. Spohn defines causation as the transitive 
closure (pp. 422ff) of direct causation (pp. 354ff) and shows that these two notions can be 
conditionally objectified (ch. 15). 
While I remain skeptical that the “natural” or alethic modalities that can be objectified in this 
sense are rich enough for causation (Huber 2011) and metaphysics in general, I admire the 
general spirit of the project: to work out in constructive detail and formal precision the 
positive claims and see how far one gets. Doing so is difficult, and working through it is not 
easy either. But that is, mainly, because philosophy is difficult. 
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